The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy Edited by David Gray Adler and Larry N. George Foreword by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 416 pages, 6 x 9 Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-0756-3, $22.95 In this provocative and readable volume, eleven leading constitutional authorities challenge "business as usual" in American foreign policymaking. For far too long, they contend, Americans have acquiesced to presidential claims to sweeping executive powers in foreign affairs--thanks to imperial-minded presidents, a weak-willed Congress, and neglectful scholars. These authors forcefully argue that the president is not the supreme crafter of foreign policy and that Congress must provide more than a rubber stamp for the president's agenda. Unilateral presidential control of foreign relations, they warn, can pose a grave threat to our nation's welfare and is simply without constitutional warrant. Combining constitutional theory with keen historical insights, these authors illuminate the roots of presidential abuse of executive power and remind us of the past and potential costs of such disregard for our unique system of checks-and-balances. An essential guide for all concerned citizens and members of Congress, this volume should help revive a proper understanding of this crucial dimension of American democracy. Table of Contents Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs David Gray Adler Democratic Theory and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy Larry N. George The President, Congress, and the Fulcrum of Foreign Policy Robert J. Spitzer Presidential Prerogative and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism Donald L. Robinson The President's Recognition Power David Gray Adler Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs Harold Hongju Koh The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking David Gray Adler The Spending Power Louis Fisher The War Powers Act and the Persian Gulf Edward Keynes The Washington Administration, Congress, and Algiers Gerhard Casper The Quasi-War and Presidential Warmaking Dean Alfange, Jr. Secrecy and Constitutional Controls in The Federalist Period Daniel N. Hoffman The Barbary Wars: Legal Precedent for Invading Haiti? Louis Fisher Truman in Korea Louis Fisher Appendices: Federalist Papers 64, 69, 75 and the ten most relevant foreign affairs cases, including Dellums v. Bush and U.S. v. Curtiss–Wright. "These provocative essays on the delicate partnership of Congress and the president are must reading for members of Congress, presidents, presidential advisers, and all serious students of American constitutionalism."--Thomas E. Cronin, author of The State of the Presidency "A well-conceived and impressive book that will be useful for both scholars and general readers."--Jules Lobel, lead attorney in Dellums v. Bush "An important contribution to the growing body of literature on separate and shared national security powers in our democracy."--Stephen Dycus, coauthor of National Security Law DAVID GRAY ADLER teaches political science at Idaho State University. He is the author of The Constitution and the Termination of Treaties and coeditor of The Presidency and the Law: The Clinton Legacy. LARRY N. GEORGE is associate professor of political science at California State University, Long Beach.   Home | About the Press | Recent Awards | Contact Us | Order New Books: | By Author | By Subject | By Title | By Series Books in Print: | By Author | By Subject | By Title | By Series ©2007 University Press of Kansas 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, KS 66045-4444 Phone (785) 864-4155; Fax (785) 864-4586