Lee, Grant and Sherman
A Study in Leadership in the 186465 Campaign
Alfred H. Burne
Introduction by Douglas Southall Freeman
Foreword and endnotes by Albert Castel
October 2000
Modern War Studies
280 pages, 25 maps, 6 x 9
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-1072-3, $29.95
Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-1073-0, $16.95
Had Lee enjoyed the manpower or
matériel advantages of Grant, would the South have triumphed?
Had Hood possessed strength superior to Sherman's, would he still
have lost their encounters in Georgia? Popular sentiment has
long bowed to the military leadership of the Civil War's victorious
generals--a view that has been disputed by modern scholarship.
Many might be startled to learn that a British army officer also
called these opinions into question long ago.
Out of print for more than fifty years, Lee, Grant and Sherman
is an unrecognized classic of Civil War history that presaged
current scholarship by decades. Alfred H. Burne assesses the
military leadership of Grant, Lee, Sherman, Hood, Johnston, Early,
and Sheridan from mid-1864 to Appomattox, contradicting prevailing
perceptions of the generals and even proposing that Grant's military
capabilities were inferior to Lee's.
Burne sought to challenge the orthodox views of other historians--J.
F. C. Fuller on Grant and Basil Liddell Hart on Sherman--but
his assessments were so unorthodox that even with the endorsement
of preeminent Civil War historian Douglas Southall Freeman, his
book received scant attention in its day. He sees Sherman as
more concerned with the geographical objective of capturing Atlanta
than the military goal of smashing the Confederate army, lacking
Grant's understanding that the principal object of war is to
conquer and destroy the enemy's armed forces. Yet he asserts
that "Grant in his heart of hearts feared Lee" and
also suggests that Jubal Early's Valley campaign might have been
the most brilliant of the whole war.
In his analysis of the Georgia campaign, Burne views Sherman
as a general who avoided risk and was too obsessed with raiding
to wage an all-out offensive battle. Refusing to dismiss Hood
as incompetent, as many historians have done, Burne points to
his brilliance in military planning and claims that most of his
defeats were merely the result of inadequate resources.
Burne's book was ahead of its time, anticipating later shifts
in historical evaluations of Civil War leadership. Now available
in a corrected edition, with Freeman's original introduction
and a new foreword and endnotes by Albert Castel, it is a rich
source of insight for scholars--and for anyone willing to reconsider
traditional views of these generals.
"Burne's book glows with a prophetic light. . . . His
unorothodox judgments . . . anticipated a major shift, starting
in the 1960s, in historical evaluations of military leadership
during the Civil War. . . . [These views have] gained so many
converts and promise to gain so many more that [they] might well
be on the way to becoming the new orthodoxy."--from the
Foreword by Albert Castel
ALFRED H. BURNE (18861959) was the author of eight
books, including The Art of War on Land, and military
editor of Chambers's Encyclopedia.
ALBERT CASTEL is author of Decision
in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864, winner of
the Lincoln Prize, and Tom Taylor's
Civil War.
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