Spies and Commandos
How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam
Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé
New in paperback: September 2001
x, 348 pages, 25 photographs, 6 maps, 6 x 9
Modern War Studies
Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-1147-8, $17.95 (t)
Also available in cloth
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-1002-0, $34.95 (t)
WINNER OF THE RICHARD W. LEOPOLD PRIZE, SPONSORED BY THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS
SELECTION OF THE MILITARY BOOK CLUB
During the Vietnam war, the U.S.
sought to undermine Hanoi's subversion of the Saigon regime by
sending Vietnamese operatives behind enemy lines. A secret to
most Americans, this covert operation was far from secret in
Hanoi: all of the commandos were killed or captured, and many
were turned by the Communists to report false information.
Spies and Commandos traces the rise and demise of this
secret operation--started by the CIA in 1960 and expanded by
the Pentagon beginning in1964--in the first book to examine the
program from both sides of the war. Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé
interviewed CIA and military personnel and traveled in Vietnam
to locate former commandos who had been captured by Hanoi, enabling
them to tell the complete story of these covert activities from
high-level decision making to the actual experiences of the agents.
The book vividly describes scores of dangerous missions-including
raids against North Vietnamese coastal installations and the
air--dropping of dozens of agents into enemy territory--as well
as psychological warfare designed to make Hanoi believe the "resistance
movement" was larger than it actually was. It offers a more
complete operational account of the program than has ever been
made available--particularly its early years--and ties known
events in the war to covert operations, such as details of the
"34-A Operations" that led to the Tonkin Gulf incidents
in 1964. It also explains in no uncertain terms why the whole
plan was doomed to failure from the start.
One of the remarkable features of the operation, claim the
authors, is that its failures were so glaring. They argue that
the CIA, and later the Pentagon, were unaware for years that
Hanoi had compromised the commandos, even though some agents
missed radio deadlines or filed suspicious reports. Operational
errors were not attributable to conspiracy or counterintelligence,
they contend, but simply to poor planning and lack of imagination.
Although it flourished for ten years under cover of the wider
war, covert activity in Vietnam is now recognized as a disaster.
Conboy and Andradé's account of that episode is a sobering
tale that lends a new perspective on the war as it reclaims the
lost lives of these unsung spies and commandos.
"A marvelous and convincing book brimming with evidence
that a strategy of dealing with foreign dictators by plotting
their removal is no strategy at all."--Wall Street
Journal
"A pathbreaking book that's also a good read."--Washington
Times
"Conboy and Andradé have constructed a readable,
almost mission-by-mission account of the SOG operations, from
the policy decisions of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
to the experiences of the agents themselves. The book's most
riveting sections are the many suspenseful accounts of cross-border
missions--complete with names, dates, places, acronyms, code
names, and a detailed cataloguing of weapons and espionage equipment
used by the spies and commandos."--Publishers Weekly
"Out of the troubled history of the Vietnam War comes
this well-researched and detailed study of the doomed, covert
U.S. war against North Vietnam. . . . A compelling story of good
intentions defeated by naivete and a vigilant enemy. Most revealing
is the involvement of the Taiwanese in this secret program. Recommended
for all public libraries."--Library Journal
"Valuable, well researched, and well written, Spies
and Commandos does an excellent job of dispelling the mists
of classification and time that have long hidden the Studies
and Observations Group (SOG)."--Special Warfare
"Poor planning, lack of imagination, too little knowledge
of a far-off country and its people--all were partly responsible
for the program's failure. What was most astonishing was that
both the CIA and the Pentagon took so long to realize that their
efforts had been compromised. What was most reprehensible, say
the authors, was that the United States turned its back on the
few commandos who survived."--Proceedings of the Naval
Institute
"An important study of United States-sponsored intelligence
operations and guerrilla and psychological warfare."--Journal
of Military History
"A superb work that chronicles the unsuccessful attempts
by the United States to undermine North Vietnam from within.
Recommended for all libraries."--Choice
"A major work that goes beyond what is in any of the
other books that touch on these aspects of the Vietnam war-including
Sedgwick Tourison's Secret Army, Secret War."--John
Prados, author of The Hidden History of the Vietnam War
"Spies and Commandos is full of enlightening and
fascinating details. Conboy and Andradé deserve praise
for their diligent research, cogent analysis, and significant
contribution to understanding America's secret war in Vietnam."--H.
R. McMaster, author of Dereliction of Duty
"The story Conboy and Andradé tell is fascinating,
their research very impressive, and their prose style engaging."--Marilyn
Young, author of The Vietnam War, 19451990
KENNETH CONBOY is a former policy analyst and deputy director
at the Heritage Foundation whose other books include The
CIAs Secret War in Tibet and Spies
in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs.
DALE ANDRADE is a historian at the U.S. Army Center
of Military History and author of Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix
Program and the Vietnam War and America's
Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi's 1972 Easter Offensive.
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