Commanders in Chief
Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars
Edited by Joseph G. Dawson III
Foreword by Raymond G. O'Connor
xviii, 230 pages, 6 photographs, 6 x 9
Modern War Studies
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-0578-1, $29.95
Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-0579-8, $14.95
Since 1798, when Congress authorized
John Adams to employ the navy to capture armed French vessels
preying on American shipping on the Atlantic coast, U.S. presidents
have grappled with the crucible of war. Some have dealt with
it skillfully while others have tended toward the inept. Some
have wanted to exert their war powers while others have shied
away from them. Some have been successful while others have not.
Never having had their authority clearly defined, the presidents,
as commanders in chief, have been allowed to interpret the scope
of their involvement in wartime decision making. The question
of whether a president can order forces into combat against another
nation has never been resolved and precedent supports both sides.
"Essentially," says Raymond O'Connor, "the president
can do whatever he can get away with."
Commanders in Chief, offering an enlightening look
at the president's constitutional and political roles during
wartime, brings together the work of prominent historians. These
experts analyze the war powers of the presidency as well as the
wartime leadership of six presidents--William McKinley, Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and
Richard Nixon.
Two of the authors take provocative revisionist views of their
subjects. Lewis Gould asserts that McKinley delivered able and
talented leadership during the Spanish-American War, while Robert
Ferrell sharply criticizes Wilson's leadership during World War
I. On the other hand, Warren Kimball emphatically confirms the
high ranking by most scholars of Roosevelt as the most gifted
wartime chief executive of the twentieth century, and Clayton
James substantiates Truman's feisty and pragmatic leadership
in two conflicts. In Frank Vandiver's essay on Johnson and Stephen
Ambrose's on Nixon, the authors emphasize the diversity of challenges
the two presidents faced during the controversial Vietnam War.
Revising and updating earlier studies, including The Ultimate
Decision: The President as Commander in Chief, the 1960 classic
collection edited by Ernest May, this book offers a thoughtful
and thought-provoking critique of the character and capabilities
of America's modern commanders in chief and presents fresh insight
into an issue that affects us all.
"This book will inform and delight a large readership
of specialists in American diplomatic and military history."--Robert
D. Schulzinger, author of Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy.
JOSEPH G. DAWSON III is associate professor of history
and director of the Military Studies Institute at Texas A&M
University. He is the author of Doniphan's
Epic March: The 1st Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War,
Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 18621877
and associate editor of the Dictionary of American Military
Biography.
CONTRIBUTORS: Stephen E. Ambrose, University of New
Orleans; Roger A. Beaumont, Texas A&M University; Joseph
G. Dawson III, Texas A&M University; Robert H. Ferrell, Emeritus,
Indiana University; Lewis L. Gould, University of Texas; Norman
A. Graebner, Emeritus, University of Virginia; D. Clayton James,
Virginia Military Institute; Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers; Raymond
G. O'Connor, University of Miami, Florida; Frank E. Vandiver,
Texas A&M
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