MacArthur's ULTRA
Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945
Edward J. Drea
xvi, 296 pages, 8 photographs, 9 maps, 6 x 9
Modern War Studies
Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-0576-7, $15.95
Cracking the enemy's radio code
is a task so urgent and so difficult that it demands the military's
best minds and most sophisticated technology. But when the coded
messages are in a language as complex as Japanese, decoding problems
multiply dramatically.
It took the U.S. Army a full two years after the attack on
Pearl Harbor to break the codes of the Japanese Imperial Army.
But by 1944 the U.S. was decoding more than 20,000 messages a
month filled with information about enemy movements, strategy,
fortifications, troop strengths, and supply convoys.
In MacArthur's ULTRA, historian Edward Drea recounts
the story behind the Army's painstaking decryption operation
and its dramatic breakthrough. He demonstrates how ULTRA (intelligence
from decrypted Japanese radio communications) shaped MacArthur's
operations in New Guinea and the Philippines and its effect on
the outcome of World War II.
From sources on both sides of the Pacific and national security
agency declassified records, Drea has compiled a detailed listing
of the ULTRA intelligence available to MacArthur. By correlating
the existing intelligence with MacArthur's operational decisions,
Drea shows how MacArthur used--and misused--intelligence information.
He tells for the first time the story behind MacArthur's bold
leap to Hollandia in 1944 and shows how ULTRA revealed the massive
Japanese mobilization for what might have been (had it occurred)
the bloodiest and most protracted engagement of the entire war--the
Allied invasion of Japan. Drea also clarifies the role of ULTRA
in Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, and
concludes that ULTRA shortened the war by six to ten months.
"A must for anyone with more than a superficial interest
in World War II or military history. This is the first comprehensive
examination of General Douglas MacArthur's use of ULTRA. Drea's
use of primary sources and secondary Japanese material results
in a balanced picture that gives both sides of the story. Particularly
fascinating is his description of the Japanese codes themselves
and how they were decoded by MacArthur's Central Bureau."--Choice
"Drea's excellent study presents a detailed illustration
of the interplay between intelligence-gathering and operational
planning and uses one of history's most successful commanders
as its model."--Publishers Weekly
"A superb book that will surely be the prime reference
work on the subject for years to come."--Cryptologia
"No one writing on military operations in the Southwest
Pacific will be able to ignore this book."--William M.
Leary, editor of We Shall Return: MacArthur's Commanders
and the Defeat of Japan, 19411945
"Adds significantly to our understanding of the war and
of MacArthur as commander and strategist."--Stanley L.
Falk, author of Bataan: The March of Death
"A 'must' item for analysis of the Pacific war."--Harold
Deutsch, author of Hitler and His Generals
"Belongs in all War II collections."--Library
Journal
EDWARD J. DREA is chief of the Research and Analysis
Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington,
D.C., and author of The 1942 Japanese General Election.
He is fluent in Japanese.
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