Stumbling Colossus The Red Army on the Eve of World War David M. Glantz 408 pages, 40 photographs, 8 maps, 6 x 9 Modern War Studies Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-0879-9, $39.95 Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns--and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany. Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete order of battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces for the first time available texts of Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated. At a time when the war in eastern Europe is being blamed on a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness, as well as its willingness, to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore. "The most thorough and intensive examination of the state of the Red Army in 1941 yet to appear. Glantz's evidence is unchallengeable, his sources unimpeachable, his conclusion incontestable: the Red Army's unpreparedness for war in 1941 was truly appalling."--John Erickson, author of The Road to Stalingrad "Effectively refutes the charge--recently rehabilitated by Viktor Suvorov in Icebreaker--that Stalin was secretly planning an offensive war against Hitler during 1941.With his previous book When Titans Clashed and this latest contribution, David Glantz has established firmly his reputation as the preeminent historian of the Soviet Army."--Mark von Hagen, author of Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship "An outstanding contribution and a must for any student of the history of the Red Army and the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War."--Malcolm Mackintosh, author of Juggernaut: A History of Soviet Armed Forces DAVID M. GLANTZ is the author of The Battle for Leningrad, 1941–1944, The Battle of Kursk, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942, and When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, all published by Kansas.   Home | About the Press | Recent Awards | Contact Us | Order New Books: | By Author | By Subject | By Title | By Series Books in Print: | By Author | By Subject | By Title | By Series ©2007 University Press of Kansas 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, KS 66045-4444 Phone (785) 864-4155; Fax (785) 864-4586