Weapons Don't Make War
Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology
Colin S. Gray
xii, 236 pages, 6 x 9
Modern War Studies
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-0559-0, $29.95
"Weaponry
does not equal strategy, argues Colin Gray, but the two are often
confused, resulting in such linguistic errors as "strategic
weapons." There may be an interactive relationship between
policy, strategy, and weaponry but, he contends, policy and strategy
always take the front seat.
An established scholar in strategic studies and longtime analyst
of the U.S. defense establishment, Gray presents in Weapons
Don't Make War a powerful statement on the interrelations
among policymaking, strategic planning, and military technology.
He argues that policy shapes strategy and gives meaning to
weapons (not vice versa): that, without clear policy guidance,
the weapons acquisitions process degenerates into political arm-wrestling;
that military technology is only one of the many servants of
defense policy (and by no means the most important); that the
"arms race" concept creates more confusion than clarity
in studying international security; that the pursuit of arms
control is seriously flawed by the belief that international
conflict can be reduced to a problem of administration and management;
that uncertainty is an essential condition of--not simply a problem
for--defense policy; and that nuclear-age history confirm much
of the accepted wisdom of modern strategic theory.
Always provocative and sometimes controversial, Gray provides
a rare, detailed, and multi-angled examination of just how policy
and weapons influence--or fail to influence--each other. His
arguments in Weapons Don't Make War are not time bound;
they hold regardless of the evolution of eastern Europe or of
shifts in U.S. policy and strategy. They offer insight into "the
basics" of national security not only in the post-Cold War
era, but for all time.
"A probing discussion of some of the most important questions
of the relationships between military force and foreign policy.
As we move into an increasingly complex era, we will need to
think clearly and creatively about these matters. Whether one
agrees with Gray's conclusions, this book will clarify as well
as stimulate our thinking."--Robert Jervis, author
of The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect
of Armageddon
"Colin Gray has established himself as a unique commentator
on the current strategic scene. He is a strategic thinker who,
as Clausewitz suggests, keeps himself firmly grounded in the
laboratory of history. What he has to say is of real relevance
to policymakers, academics, and those concerned with where American
defense policy must go in the new emerging world."--Williamson
Murray, author of German Military Effectiveness
"Colin Gray's voice is one of the most penetrating in
contemporary strategic studies; and it is one which will help
to establish the character and agenda of strategic discourse
in the years ahead."--Journal of Strategic Studies
COLIN S. GRAY is chairman of the National Institute
for Public Policy. He is the author of eleven other books, including
War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next
Century and Nuclear Strategy and National Style. From
1982 to 1987 he was a member of the President's General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, and in 1988 he received
the Distinguished Service Award from the U.S. Department of the
Navy for his contribution to the development of the maritime
strategy.
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