Inside Hitler's High Command
Geoffrey P. Megargee
Foreword by Williamson Murray
New in Paperback: March 2002
350 pages, 20 photographs, 6 x 9
Modern War Studies
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-1015-0, $34.95
Paper ISBN 978-0-7006-1187-4, $17.95
WINNER, SOCIETY OF MILITARY HISTORY DISTINGUISHED BOOK AWARD
MAIN SELECTION OF THE HISTORY BOOK CLUB
Challenging previous accounts,
Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would
have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled
in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command
was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged.
Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler
was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals
were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic defeat.
Megargee exposes the structure, processes, and personalities
that governed the Third Reich's military decision making and
shows how Germany's presumed battlefield superiority was undermined
by poor strategic and operational planning at the highest levels.
His study tracks the evolution of German military leadership
under the Nazis from 1933 to 1945 and expands our understanding
of the balance of power within the high command, the role of
personalities in its organizational development, and the influence
of German military intellectuals on its structure and function.
He also shows how the organization of the high command was plagued
by ambition, stubbornness, political intrigue, and overworked
staff officers. And his "a week in the life" chapter
puts the high command under a magnifying glass to reveal its
inner workings during the fierce fighting on the Russian Front
in December 1941.
Megargee also offers new insights into the high command crises
of 1938 and shows how German general staff made fatal mistakes
in their planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Their arrogant
dismissal of the Soviet military's ability to defend its homeland
and virtual disregard for the extensive intelligence and sound
logistics that undergird successful large-scale military campaigns
ultimately came back to haunt them.
In the final assessment, observes Megargee, the generals'
strategic ideas were no better than Hitler's and often worse.
Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder, and the rest were as guilty of
self-deception as their Führer, believing that innate German
superiority and strength of will were enough to overcome nearly
any obstacle. Inside Hitler's High Command exposes these
surprising flaws and illuminates the process of strategy and
decision making in the Third Reich.
"One of the most persistent myths to come out of WWII
is that the Third Reich failed because a militarily incompetent
Adolf Hitler and a small circle of yes-men consistently overrode
the professional judgment of the German General Staff. If Hitler
had left his commanders to their own devices, the story goes,
we might all be speaking German today. In this meticulously documented
work, Megargee does much to dispel this longstanding belief.
. . .An immensely illuminating work that casts plenty of blame
all around, this will surely provoke much discussion among historians
and readers with an interest in the Third Reich."--Publishers
Weekly
"How does one explain the mind set of the high command
and the strategic framework within which the Germans lost the
war? How did the high command reach and implement its decisions?
No one has answered these questions systematically before. This
extraordinary and fascinating book fills that gap in the literature
on World War II."--Williamson Murray, author of The
Luftwaffe, 193345
"Comprehensive, well written, important. Megargee does
a first-rate job in describing the personalities of the high
command and their relationships."
James S. Corum, author of The Roots of Blitzkrieg
"Megargee permits us a fresh perspective on both the
magnetic figure of Adolf Hitler and his military advisers."--Jürgen
Förster, Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
"Hitler emerges from these pages as an adept manipulator.
He took full advantage of the tensions in the command structure
to divide it and focus it on himself. But he took the officers
nowhere they were not at least ready, if not immediately willing,
to go."--Dennis Showalter, author of Tannenberg:
Clash of Empire
GEOFFREY P. MEGARGEE is Applied Research Scholar at
the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum, and a contributor to World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia.
|